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Abstract
We present MemEC, an erasure-coding-based in-
memory key-value (KV) store that achieves high avail-
ability and fast recovery while keeping low data redun-
dancy across storage servers. MemEC is specifically de-
signed for workloads dominated by small objects. By
encoding objects in entirety, MemEC is shown to incur
60% less storage redundancy for small objects than ex-
isting replication- and erasure-coding-based approaches.
It also supports graceful transitions between decentral-
ized requests in normal mode (i.e., no failures) and co-
ordinated requests in degraded mode (i.e., with failures).
We evaluate our MemEC prototype via testbed experi-
ments under read-heavy and update-heavy YCSB work-
loads. We show that MemEC achieves high throughput
and low latency in both normal and degraded modes, and
supports fast transitions between the two modes.
1 Introduction
Memory-centric storage systems have been proposed to
keep primary data in memory to enable scalable, low-
latency data access. They are often realized as in-
memory key-value (KV) stores, which organize data in
memory as KV pairs (called objects) to form struc-
tured storage. Enterprises have deployed in-memory KV
stores for low-latency operations in social networking,
web search, and analytics (e.g., [3, 14, 40]).
Failures are prevalent in distributed storage [28]. To
maintain data availability, most existing in-memory KV
stores replicate data copies across storage servers [2, 4,
8, 10, 35, 40]. However, replication incurs high storage
overhead and multiplies the memory cost, which is still
much higher than the cost of traditional disk-based stor-
age. RAMCloud [41] keeps replicas in secondary stor-
age for persistence, yet accessing secondary storage for
failure recovery incurs high latency, especially for ran-
dom I/Os (e.g., the typical hard disk seek time is around
10ms).
This motivates us to explore erasure coding for in-
memory KV storage. Erasure coding transforms data
into fixed-size encoded chunks, such that the original
data can be recovered from a subset of encoded chunks.
It achieves the same fault tolerance with much lower re-
dundancy than replication [48]. Thus, we can leverage
erasure coding to keep minimum data redundancy en-
tirely in memory. Failure recovery can then be done by
directly accessing other working memory-based storage
servers for encoded chunks, thereby maintaining low ac-
cess latency. A drawback of erasure coding is its high
performance overhead in terms of network bandwidth
and disk I/O, especially in data updates and failure recov-
ery. Thus, extensive studies focus on solving the perfor-
mance issues of erasure-coded storage (e.g., [31,34,46]).
To deploy erasure coding in in-memory KV storage,
we argue that two specific challenges need to be ad-
dressed in addition to mitigating overheads in data up-
dates and failure recovery. First, Facebook’s field study
[15] shows that real-life KV storage workloads are dom-
inated by small objects, whose keys and values are of
small sizes (e.g., ranging from few bytes to tens or hun-
dreds of bytes). In particular, one workload has keys
with either 16 or 21 bytes and almost all values with
2 bytes only; another workload has up to 40% of val-
ues with only 2, 3, and 11 bytes [15]. It is infeasible to
perform erasure coding directly on an extremely small
object (e.g., 2 bytes), as we need to first decompose the
object into chunks before encoding (§2). Second, to min-
imize access latency, in-memory KV stores issue decen-
tralized requests without centralized metadata lookups.
However, when failures happen, ongoing requests may
need to be reverted or replayed to avoid inconsistency.
In erasure coding, we also need to maintain consistency
across encoded chunks that are dependent on each other.
We present MemEC, an erasure-coding-based in-
memory KV store with access performance, storage ef-
ficiency, and fault tolerance in mind. MemEC works as
a high-availability distributed cache that supports low-
latency data access for read-intensive [15] or update-
intensive [16, 47] workloads, and also enables fast re-
covery by accessing data redundancy from other working
in-memory storage servers without the need of accessing
secondary storage.
MemEC supports small objects via a new all-encoding
data model, which encodes objects in entirety, including
keys, values, and metadata, so as to significantly reduce
storage redundancy for fault tolerance. We carefully de-
sign the index structures for the all-encoding data model
to reduce memory footprints, such that all objects and in-
dex structures are kept entirely in memory. Our analysis
shows that our all-encoding data model saves up to 60%
of redundancy over the replication- and erasure-coding-
based approaches used by existing in-memoryKV stores.
See §3.
MemEC allows decentralized requests for reads,
writes, updates, and deletes in normal mode (i.e., no fail-
ures), which is the common case in practice. It ensures
graceful transitions between normal mode and degraded
mode (i.e., with failures), such that each request in de-
gradedmode will be centrally coordinated and redirected
from a failed server to another working server. It also
maintains both availability and consistency during tran-
sitions. See §4 and §5.
We implement a MemEC prototype that can be fully
deployed on commodity hardware in a cloud environ-
ment. We conduct testbed experiments under read-heavy
and update-heavy workloads generated by YCSB [23].
In normal mode, MemEC achieves comparable perfor-
mance to both Memcached [7] and Redis [8] (e.g., laten-
cies are in the range of few milliseconds). It also effi-
ciently operates in degraded mode, and completes tran-
sitions between normal and degraded modes within mil-
liseconds. See §6 and §7.
The source code of our MemEC prototype is available
at https://github.com/mtyiu/memec.
2 Erasure Coding
Erasure coding is typically constructed by two config-
urable parameters n and k (where k < n). We treat data
as a collection of fixed-size units called chunks. Every
k original chunks (called data chunks) are encoded into
n − k additional equal-size coded chunks (called parity
chunks), such that the set of the n data and parity chunks
is called a stripe. We consider erasure codes that are
maximum distance separable (MDS), meaning that the
encoding operations ensure that any k of the n data and
parity chunks of the same stripe can sufficiently decode
the original k data chunks, while incurring the minimum
storage redundancy (i.e., nk times the original data size).
Reed-Solomon (RS) codes [44] are one well-known ex-
ample of MDS erasure codes.
A storage system contains multiple stripes of data that
are independently encoded, and hence our analysis fo-
cuses on a single stripe. The n chunks of each stripe are
stored in n distinct servers to tolerate server failures. We
call the server that stores a data (parity) chunk a data
(parity) server. Since each stripe is stored in a different
set of servers, a server may act as either a data server or
a parity server for different stripes; in other words, the
naming of a data or parity server is logical.
Each update to a data chunk will trigger an update
to every parity chunk of the same stripe. To mitigate
the network overhead of parity updates, we leverage the
linearity property of erasure coding without transferring
any existing parity chunk for the update. For example,
RS codes encode data chunks by linear combinations
based on Galois Field arithmetic. Specifically, a par-
ity chunk (denoted by P ) is encoded by k data chunks
(denoted by D1, D2, · · · , Dk) via a linear combination
as P =
∑k
i=1 γiDi for some encoding coefficients γi’s
(1 ≤ i ≤ k). Suppose that a data chunk Di is now up-
dated to D′i. We can compute the new parity chunk as
P ′ = P + γi(D
′
i −Di), where (D
′
i −Di) is called the
data delta. Thus, when a data server applies an update
to a chunk, it sends the data delta directly to each parity
server, which can then use the data delta to compute the
new parity chunk. Previous studies have exploited the
linearity property for parity updates in RAID [18] and
distributed storage [12, 16, 50].
Erasure coding generally requires the chunk size be
large enough. For example, RS codes require n≤2w−1,
where w is the number of bits of a chunk [43]. To deploy
RS codes, it is typical to set w as a multiple of 8 to align
with machine word boundaries; in other words, a chunk
needs to be at least one byte long. For an extremely small
object (e.g., 2 bytes long [15]), dividing it into k (e.g.,
k > 2) data chunks for encoding can be infeasible.
3 Data Model
In this section, we propose a data model for small ob-
jects in in-memory KV stores. Each object in a KV store
comprises three fields: a key, a value, and metadata, such
that both the key and value have variable sizes, while
we assume that the metadata has a fixed size for sim-
plicity. The key is a unique identifier for an object; the
value holds the actual content of the object; the meta-
data holds the object attributes such as the key size, the
value size, creation/modification timestamps, etc. Also,
the KV store has an index structure that holds the refer-
ences to all objects for object retrievals.
3.1 Existing Data Models
We revisit two existing data models that achieve fault
tolerance via redundancy, namely all-replication and
hybrid-encoding. Both data models have been realized
in existing in-memory KV stores.
All-replication stores multiple replicas for each ob-
ject, including the key, value, metadata, and reference
to the object. It has been used in Facebook’s Mem-
cache [40], DXRAM [35], RAMCloud [41], and various
open-source in-memory KV stores (e.g., [2, 4, 8, 10]). If
there is a failed object, the KV store retrieves its replica
from another working server. Most KV stores directly
store replicas in memory. To reduce memory footprints,
RAMCloud stores replicas in secondary storage, but this
incurs expensive I/Os when there are intensive random
reads to failed objects.
Hybrid-encoding combines erasure coding and repli-
cation. It applies erasure coding to the value only, while
applying replication for the key, metadata, and reference
to the object. Its rationale is that if the value size is signif-
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Figure 1: All-encoding data model. Each server keeps a
local copy of both object and chunk indexes, while the
chunks are distributed across servers.
icantly large, applying erasure coding to values only suf-
fices to reduce storage redundancy. Specifically, hybrid-
encoding performs (n, k) erasure coding across object
values, such that the values of multiple objects are com-
bined to form a data chunk, and the k data chunks in the
same stripe are encoded to n−k parity chunks. For each
object, hybrid-encoding replicates the key, metadata, and
any index information across n − k + 1 servers, includ-
ing the data server that stores the object (which is em-
bedded in the data chunk) and the n − k parity servers.
Thus, every object can tolerate any n − k server fail-
ures. Hybrid-encoding has been adopted by existing KV
stores, such as LH*RS [38], Atlas [36], and the recently
proposed in-memory KV store Cocytus [50]. In partic-
ular, Cocytus focuses on the value size of at least 1KB
in evaluation [50]. The drawback of hybrid-encoding is
that if the value size is very small, it still incurs signifi-
cant storage overhead due to the replication of keys and
metadata.
3.2 Our Data Model
We now propose a new data model called all-encoding,
whose idea is to apply erasure coding to objects in en-
tirety (including keys, values, and metadata) without
replication. In addition, we carefully design our index
structure to limit its storage overhead.
Data organization: Figure 1 shows the data organiza-
tion of the all-encoding model. We organize data as
fixed-size chunks, which form the units of erasure cod-
ing. A larger chunk size provides better storage effi-
ciency by mitigating the storage overhead due to index-
ing (see details below), yet it also incurs higher com-
putational overhead in encoding/decoding. Our current
implementation chooses 4KB as the default chunk size
to balance the trade-off. For each chunk, we prepend
a unique fixed-size chunk ID (8 bytes in our case) for
chunk identification in a server.
All-encoding performs erasure coding across objects
in entirety. Suppose that every object is small, such that
its total size is smaller than the chunk size (i.e., the object
can fit into a single chunk). Thus, each data chunk can
contain multiple objects, each of which starts with meta-
data, followed by a key and a value. We append new ob-
jects to a data chunk until the chunk size limit is reached,
and seal the data chunk so that no new objects can be
further added. Sealed data chunks will later be encoded
to form parity chunks belonging to the same stripe.
For indexing, we introduce two hash tables: the chunk
index, which maps a chunk ID to a chunk reference, and
the object index, which maps a key to an object reference.
We emphasize that we do not need to keep redundancy
for both indexes for fault tolerance; instead, each server
only keeps a local copy of both indexes. The reason is
that when a server fails, we can reconstruct the failed
chunks from other available servers by erasure coding,
and rebuild both indexes by reinserting the references of
the reconstructed objects and chunks into the object and
chunk indexes, respectively. In other words, the redun-
dancy of both indexes is implicitly included in chunk-
level redundancy.
To improve storage efficiency of both indexes, we ap-
ply cuckoo hashing [42], which has constant lookup and
amortized update times. Its idea is to use two hash func-
tions to map a key to two possible locations (called buck-
ets). Each inserted key is stored in either free bucket; if
no free bucket is available, we relocate any existing key
to make room for the inserted key. We set both indexes to
be 4-way set-associative (i.e., each bucket contains four
slots, each storing a reference), and it is shown that the
space utilization can reach over 90% [26]. Currently, we
do not consider range queries, which can be supported
by tree-based indexes [49].
Chunk ID: To support updates and recovery, we need
to locate the data and parity chunks of the same stripe.
We leverage the chunk ID for this purpose. We decom-
pose a chunk ID into three fields: (i) stripe list ID, which
identifies the set of n data and parity servers that stores
the stripe associated with the chunk (§4.2), (ii) stripe ID,
which identifies a stripe in the storage system, and (iii)
chunk position, which numbers the position of the chunk
in a stripe from 0 to n−1. In particular, the data and par-
ity chunks of the same stripe will have the same stripe list
ID and same stripe ID. To obtain a stripe ID, each server
maintains a local counter (initialized from zero) for each
stripe list. Each time when a chunk is sealed, the data
server sets the stripe ID as the current counter value, fol-
lowed by incrementing the counter value by one. Each
parity server encodes the data chunks of the same stripe
into a parity chunk, which inherits the stripe list ID and
stripe ID from the data chunks.
We use the chunk ID and both object and chunk in-
dexes to locate an object. We align all fixed-size chunks
(including the 8-byte chunk ID and 4KB chunk content)
in the address space of each server. To update an ob-
ject, we locate the object in the data server via the object
index, and then obtain the corresponding chunk ID that
is stored at the head of the chunk. Using the chunk ID,
we identify each corresponding parity server, in which
we can locate the parity chunk of the same stripe via the
chunk index.
We also need to maintain the mappings between each
key and chunk ID, so that when we reconstruct a failed
object during a server failure, we can identify its as-
sociated chunk ID and retrieve the chunks of the same
stripe in other servers for reconstruction. Nevertheless,
the mappings can be stored in secondary storage, since
they are only needed for recovery from failures. Thus,
the mappings do not add overhead to in-memory storage.
We elaborate how we maintain key-to-chunk mappings
in §5.3.
Handling large objects: Some workloads can have ob-
jects with large value sizes (e.g., 1MB for the ETC work-
load in Facebook [15]). We can extend our data model to
store a large object that cannot fit into a chunk, assuming
that the key size remains small. We divide an object into
fragments, each of which has the same size as a chunk
(except the last fragment whose size may be less than the
chunk size). We store each fragment as an object, and
include an offset field in the object’s metadata to specify
the position of each fragment. We encode the fragments,
together with other chunks in the same stripe, via era-
sure coding. Note that all fragments keep both key and
metadata; in particular, the same key is replicated across
fragments. However, since the value size is now large,
the storage overhead incurred by the key and metadata
becomes low.
3.3 Analysis
We analyze the redundancy overhead of the above data
models. Our analysis makes the following assumptions.
We only focus on the redundancy incurred for fault tol-
erance. Also, for all-replication and hybrid-encoding,
we only include the index overhead for locating objects
that are stored locally, while excluding their index over-
head for maintaining the correlation between the original
data and its redundancy since such implementation varies
across systems. Thus, our analysis gives underestimates
for their redundancy overhead. On the other hand, for all-
encoding, our analysis includes the index overhead due
to chunk IDs and both object and chunk indexes, while
excluding the key-to-chunkmappings as the latter can be
stored in secondary storage and only used when failures
happen (§3.2). For simplicity, our analysis assumes fixed
key and value sizes.
LetK , V ,M , andR be the key size, value size, meta-
data size, and the size of a reference, respectively. We
quantify the redundancy of a data model as the ratio of
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Figure 2: Redundancy of all-replication (AllRep),
hybrid-encoding (Hybrid), and all-encoding (AllEnc).
the actual storage size of an object with redundancy to
the original size of the object without redundancy in-
curred by fault tolerance (i.e.,K + V +M ).
All-replication: To tolerate n− k failures, we make n−
k + 1 copies for each object. The redundancy is:
(n− k + 1)(K + V +M +R)
K + V +M
.
Hybrid-encoding: To tolerate n − k failures, we repli-
cate the key, metadata, and reference of each object with
total size (n−k+1)(K+M +R) and encode the value
by erasure coding with total size nVk . The redundancy is:
(n− k + 1)(K +M +R) + nVk
K + V +M
.
All-encoding: We encode the key, value, and metadata
of each object in a data server and n − k parity servers
with total size
n(K+V+M)
k . The data server also stores a
reference to the object in its object index with total size
R
O , where O is the occupancy of the object index due to
cuckoo hashing. Each chunk also has a chunk ID, which
we assume has size I , and a reference in the chunk in-
dex with total size RO (also due to cuckoo hashing). Let
C be the chunk size, so the n chunks of a stripe store
kC
K+V+M objects on average. Thus, the average storage
size of the chunk ID and chunk reference per object is
n(I+R/O)
kC/(K+V +M) . The redundancy is:
n(K+V+M)
k +
R
O +
n(I+R/O)
kC/(K+V +M)
K + V +M
.
Numerical results: We analyze the redundancy of all
data models for differentK , V , and (n, k). We fixM =
4 bytes (assuming that the metadata only holds a 1-byte
key size and 3-byte value size), R= 8 bytes, C = 4KB,
I=8 bytes (for a chunk ID in all-encoding), andO=0.9
(§3.2).
Figure 2 presents the results for K = 8 and 32 bytes,
(n, k) = (10, 8) and (14, 10) (note that (14, 10) is used
by Facebook’s erasure coding [39]), and different values
of V (in bytes). All-encoding significantly reduces re-
dundancy especially for small key and value sizes. For
example, whenK=8, V ≤10, and (n, k)=(10, 8) (Fig-
ure 2(a)), all-replication and hybrid-encoding achieve
4.1–4.8× and 3.3–4.7× redundancy, respectively, while
all-encoding reduces the redundancy to 1.7–1.9× (up to
60.0% and 58.9% reduction, respectively). We make
similar findings for K = 32 and (n, k) = (14, 10). Both
hybrid-encoding and all-encoding are approaching nk of
redundancy as V increases, but all-encoding is clearly
faster. For example, when (n, k) = (10, 8) and K = 8,
the redundancy of all-encoding drops to below 1.3 (4%
over nk = 1.25) when V ≥ 180, while hybrid-encoding
achieves the same value when V ≥ 890.
4 MemEC Overview
4.1 System Architecture
MemEC is an in-memoryKV store that manages the stor-
age of objects with the all-encoding data model. Fig-
ure 3 shows the MemEC architecture, which comprises
three types of nodes: multiple servers, multiple proxies,
and a coordinator. Each server represents a storage node
and allocates a memory region for storage. It is attached
to persistent secondary storage (e.g., local disks or net-
worked file systems). We aggregate the memories of all
servers to a unified in-memory storage pool. Each proxy
is a front-end interface for client applications to access
objects in servers. The coordinator manages the archi-
tecture, detects failures (e.g., by periodic heartbeats), and
coordinates I/O requests in the presence of failures. Our
current prototype uses a single coordinator for simplicity,
yet we can synchronize its state to multiple backup co-
ordinators or external reliable storage for fault tolerance.
We can also deploy a distributed coordinator service via
Zookeeper [32] for improved performance.
MemEC maintains data availability due to server fail-
ures, in which in-memory storage becomes unavailable.
When there is no server failure, MemEC operates in nor-
mal mode; when a server fails, the coordinator notifies all
working proxies and servers to switch to degraded mode
and coordinates the reconstruction of any failed data.
In normal mode, MemEC distributes objects from each
proxy across servers in a decentralized manner without
involving the coordinator, as in existing in-memory KV
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.
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Server
.
.
.
Unified memory
Disks
Proxy
Proxy
.
.
.
Client
Figure 3: MemEC architecture.
stores [27, 41]. In contrast, in degraded mode, the co-
ordinator is included into the I/O path and responsible
for redirecting read/write requests away from any failed
server. Note that if a request does not involve any failed
server, it is still executed in a decentralized manner. Our
design choice builds on the fact that the common case in
practice is that MemEC runs in normal mode and uses
decentralized requests for most of the time, while the co-
ordinator is only involved in the I/O path when failures
happen. In §5, we elaborate our failure model, and state
additional design assumptions for fault tolerance.
MemEC supports linearizability. It keeps each object
in only one working server in both normal and degraded
modes. All servers process requests in a first-in-first-out
manner, so that each read to an object always returns its
value of the last write.
4.2 Stripe Management
In normal mode, MemEC distributes objects across
servers in a decentralized manner. During bootstrap,
MemEC generates a pre-configured number (denoted by
c) of stripe lists, each of which defines a set of k data
servers and n − k parity servers of an erasure-coded
stripe. Then a proxy maps an object to a server via two-
stage hashing: it first hashes the object’s key to one of
the stripe lists, followed by hashing the object’s key to
one of the data servers in the stripe list.
To generate the stripe lists, one concern is that in write-
intensive workloads, each write to a data server triggers a
write to each parity server of the same stripe, so a parity
server receives k times more write load than a data server
(assuming that all data servers receive the same amount
of write loads). Thus, we consider an algorithm that it-
eratively generates c stripe lists, with an objective of bal-
ancing the write loads across all servers. Specifically,
we assign a load variable, initialized to be zero, to each
server in MemEC. In each iteration i (where 1 ≤ i ≤ c),
we select n − k servers with the smallest loads as the
parity servers, followed by k servers with the next small-
est loads as data servers (we break any tie by choosing
servers with smaller IDs). We form the i-th stripe list
with the n selected servers. We increment the load of
each data server by 1 and that of each parity server by
k. Finally, the algorithm outputs c stripe lists, which are
installed into all proxies and servers. Note that the algo-
rithm is executed only once during system startup, and
runs in polynomial time with respect to the number of
servers and the number of stripe lists. Thus, it has lim-
ited overhead to overall system performance.
4.3 Basic Requests
MemEC realizes four basic requests of practical KV
stores: SET, GET, UPDATE, and DELETE. Here, we
focus on small objects, and handle large objects as de-
scribed in §3.2. Also, we focus on normal mode, and
address degraded mode in §5.
SET inserts a new object into storage. A proxy first se-
lects one data server and n−k parity servers as described
in §4.2. It sends the object to these servers in parallel,
each of which returns an acknowledgement upon receiv-
ing the object. The data server appends the object to a
data chunk that is not yet full (i.e., unsealed), while each
parity server keeps the object in a temporary buffer as a
replica. The data server also adds the object reference to
its own object index. Note that the data and parity servers
do not need to communicate with each other upon a SET
request. When the data chunk is full, it is sealed (§3.2).
The data server then sends the keys of the objects in the
sealed data chunk to all parity servers. Upon receiving
the keys, each parity server rebuilds the data chunk from
the objects in its temporary buffer (as the objects may
not arrive in the same order), computes the data delta
and updates its parity chunk (§2), and finally discards the
objects from its temporary buffer.
In essence, our SET operation performs (n−k+1)-
way replication until a chunk is sealed, and then applies
erasure coding to reclaim the space of replicas. The tran-
sition from replication to erasure coding only involves
the transmissions of object keys, and hence poses lim-
ited bandwidth overhead.
Each server is initialized with a pre-configured num-
ber of chunks based on the available storage capacity, and
maintains a list of currently unsealed data chunks during
execution. When it receives a new object via a SET re-
quest and is selected as the data server for storing the
object, it appends the object to the unsealed data chunk
that has the minimum remaining free space sufficient for
holding the object, so as to fill up the unsealed data chunk
as soon as possible. If all unsealed data chunks cannot
store the new object, the server will pick the unsealed
data chunk with the least free space to seal, so as to make
a free unsealed data chunk available. Since we fix the
number of unsealed data chunks, it also ensures that the
number of replicas in the temporary buffer (for unsealed
data chunks) of each parity server is small, thereby keep-
ing the storage redundancy low.
GET retrieves an object from storage. A proxy uses the
key to determine the data server that stores the object,
and requests the data server for the object’s value.
UPDATE modifies an existing object with a new value.
A proxy first identifies the data server that stores the ob-
ject, and sends the new value to the data server. The
data server then updates the object’s value and forwards
the data delta to all parity servers of the same stripe; the
set of parity servers can be determined by the chunk ID
(§3.2). Each parity server either updates the correspond-
ing parity chunk if the object is in a sealed data chunk,
or the replica in the temporary buffer if the object is in
an unsealed data chunk. After all parity servers finish the
update, the data server returns an acknowledgement to
the proxy.
Here, we allow different value sizes across objects, yet
we assume that the value size of an object remains un-
changed across updates. This keeps the size of a sealed
data chunk unchanged, thereby simplifying storage man-
agement. How to adjust the object’s value size on-the-fly
is a future work.
DELETE removes an object from storage. A proxy re-
quests the data server that stores the object to mark the
object as deleted. If the object is in a sealed data chunk,
the data server sends the data delta to all parity servers
of the same stripe as in UPDATE, by treating the new ob-
ject’s value as zero. Each parity server updates the parity
chunk accordingly. Otherwise, the data server notifies
each parity server to remove its replica from the tempo-
rary buffer. The data server returns an acknowledgement
to the proxy after the data server and all parity servers
complete the deletion. We can later reclaim the space of
the deleted objects.
5 Fault Tolerance
In this section, we describe how MemEC achieves fault
tolerance, and in particular, ensures graceful transitions
between normal and degraded modes.
5.1 Failure Model
Our failure model focuses on server failures that make
data unavailable. Server failures can be transient or per-
manent. Transient failures are temporary and do not
incur actual data loss, such as due to server overloads
and network congestion; in contrast, permanent failures
incur actual data loss. When transient failures occur,
MemEC reconstructs the unavailable data from other in-
memory working servers for fast recovery; in contrast,
when permanent failures occur, MemEC can either re-
cover lost data from other working servers or from sec-
ondary storage (Figure 3). We require that the coordi-
nator be responsible for detecting server failures, say by
periodic heartbeats (§4.1). In this work, we focus on how
MemEC reacts when transient server failures happen and
performs fast recovery.
We do not consider proxy failures when MemEC is
in degraded mode (i.e., server failures exist). In this
case, we assume that MemEC reconstructs all available
data from secondary storage. Nevertheless, our evalua-
tion shows that resolving inconsistencies is fast (less than
700ms), so it is relatively rare for this special case to hap-
pen. On the other hand, when there is no server failure,
each proxy only acts as an interface for clients to access
servers. If a proxy fails, clients can access objects in
servers through a different proxy. We also do not con-
sider coordinator failures, as we can keep backups for
the coordinator’s states (§4.1).
5.2 Server States
To maintain availability and consistency, MemEC re-
quires that all requests that involve a failed server
(called degraded requests) be managed by the coordina-
tor, which redirects a request from any failed server to a
different working server (called redirected server). How-
ever, making a graceful transition from normal mode to
degraded mode is non-trivial. Specifically, there may be
ongoing requests that inconsistently update the data and
parity chunks of a stripe. For example, in an UPDATE re-
quest, a data server sends a data delta to all parity servers
of the same stripe (§4.3). If the data server fails, we
cannot guarantee that all parity servers receive the data
delta and update their parity chunks, since the failed data
server is the only entity that keeps track of the parity up-
dates. In this case, MemEC needs to resolve any poten-
tial inconsistency caused by the incomplete request.
To address the above challenges, in MemEC, the coor-
dinator maintains server states to explicitly specify the
operational status of each server. Figure 4 shows the
server state diagram, which specifies four states:
• Normal state: It is the initial state of all servers, in
which all requests are decentralized (§4.3).
• Intermediate state: It is the state when a server fails
while data inconsistency is not yet resolved.
• Degraded state: After data inconsistency is resolved,
all proxies issue degraded requests in collaboration
with the coordinator.
• Coordinated normal state: When the failed server is
restored, the coordinator instructs the redirected server
to migrate any changes made in the degraded state
to the restored server. All proxies still issue requests
through the coordinator before the migration is com-
pleted.
Based on the current state of a server, a proxy decides
whether decentralized or degraded requests should be is-
sued to the server; for degraded requests, other working
servers are also involved to reconstruct failed data. Thus,
we require that all proxies and working servers share the
same view of the server states. To do this, we need a
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Figure 4: State diagram for failure handling.
two-phase protocol when the coordinator detects a server
failure: the coordinator first notifies all proxies to com-
plete processing requests in normal mode; after all prox-
ies have confirmed that they have completed all normal
requests, the coordinator notifies all proxies to start pro-
cessing requests in degraded mode. We leverage atomic
broadcast to realize the two-phase protocol, so that the
notifications from the coordinator in both phases are re-
liably delivered to all proxies.
We emphasize that MemEC only uses atomic broad-
cast to reliably notify all proxies about state transitions
in the presence of failures, but not for handling normal
and degraded requests. Also, when a server fails, we do
not require all proxies to transit from normal mode to
degraded mode atomically (even they have all received
the atomic broadcast message); instead, the failed server
switches to the intermediate state, in which the coordina-
tor notifies all proxies via atomic broadcast that they no
longer need to issue decentralized requests to the failed
server. After all proxies resolve inconsistencies of in-
complete requests (§5.3) and notify the coordinator, the
coordinator will issue another atomic broadcast to notify
all proxies that the server is safe to switch to the degraded
state, in which all requests are now handled through the
coordinator. We elaborate the details in the following
discussion. Our evaluation shows that the state transition
overhead is small (§7).
5.3 Backups
MemEC resolves inconsistency when a failed server is in
the intermediate state. To achieve this, it makes backups
for ongoing requests, so as to revert inconsistent changes
or replay incomplete requests. We emphasize that such
backups are only temporarily kept, and will be cleared
when data consistency is achieved. MemEC keeps three
types of backups, as explained below.
Each proxy makes backups for unacknowledged re-
quests, so that incomplete requests due to the failed
server can be replayed later as degraded requests. Specif-
ically, a proxy locally buffers each request that is sent to
a server, and clears the buffered request upon receiving
an acknowledgment.
Each proxy also makes backups for the mappings be-
tween keys and chunk IDs generated by servers to fa-
cilitate the reconstruction of failed objects. We require
that each data server periodically checkpoints the map-
pings between keys and chunk IDs to the coordinator for
recovery (§3.2). When each data server returns an ac-
knowledgement to a proxy request, it also piggybacks the
mapping between the object’s key and the chunk ID asso-
ciated with the request. The proxy then buffers the map-
ping. When a server issues a new checkpoint, it acknowl-
edges each proxy to clear its buffered mappings. During
a server failure, each proxy sends its buffered mappings
to the coordinator for reconstructing the mappings from
the latest checkpoint.
Furthermore, each parity server makes backups for the
data deltas for both UPDATE and DELETE requests, so
as to revert any changes on parity chunks made by in-
complete (unacknowledged) requests. We adopt an idea
similar to that in LH*RS [38], in which we let each
parity server store the received data deltas in a tempo-
rary buffer for possible rollbacks. When a data server
fails, the proxy that initiates an incomplete UPDATE or
DELETE request receives the updated server state from
the coordinator (§5.2). It notifies the parity servers to
revert the changes on parity chunks for the incomplete
request using the buffered data deltas. To facilitate the
removal of buffered data deltas, when a proxy issues an
UPDATE or DELETE request, it also attaches a local se-
quence number (i.e., independent of other proxies) for
the latest acknowledged request, so a parity server can
decide if any buffered data delta can be removed.
5.4 Degraded Requests
When a failed server switches to the degraded state
(i.e., after data inconsistency is resolved), the coordina-
tor redirects all degraded requests from the failed server
to a redirected server. The following explains how each
type of degraded requests works.
Degraded SET: Recall that a SET request sends an ob-
ject to a data server and n − k parity servers (§4.3). If a
proxy finds that a SET request for a new object is mapped
to a failed data or parity server, it issues a degraded SET
through the coordinator. The coordinator first identifies
the stripe list for the object. It then finds a working server
in the stripe list as the redirected server, and instructs the
proxy to write the object to the redirected server. Upon
receiving the object, the redirected server stores the ob-
ject in a temporary buffer. Later when the failed server is
restored, the redirected server migrates the object to the
restored server.
Degraded GET: If a proxy issues a GET request for an
object in a failed data server, the coordinator first maps
the object to its stripe list and selects a working server
in the stripe list as the redirected server (which can be
the same as in degraded SET). The proxy then asks the
redirected server for the object. If the object is stored in
an unsealed data chunk, the redirected server simply re-
trieves its replica from a working parity server; if the ob-
ject is stored in a sealed data chunk, the redirected server
reconstructs the whole data chunk via erasure coding to
retrieve the failed object; if the object is written via a
degraded SET, the redirected server retrieves the object
from its temporary buffer.
Here, the redirected server performs on-demand re-
construction for the data that is requested by the proxy,
instead of reconstructing all data stored in the failed
server. This avoids unnecessary decoding overhead, es-
pecially in the presence of transient failures in which data
is only temporarily unavailable. Moreover, the redirected
server reconstructs a failed object at the granularity of
chunks (i.e., the whole chunk containing the failed ob-
ject will be reconstructed). If subsequent GET requests
access the same object or other objects within the recon-
structed chunk, no extra reconstruction is needed.
Degraded UPDATE and DELETE: If a proxy issues
an UPDATE or DELETE to an object whose associated
stripe list contains a failed server, the request becomes a
degraded request. In this case, the coordinator first iden-
tifies a working server in the stripe list as the redirected
server, which first reconstructs the failed chunk (as in
degraded GET) before the object is modified or deleted.
Note that we reconstruct the failed chunk even though the
object is available in a working server (belonging to the
same stripe list as the failed server). The reason is that
each update or delete to an object also triggers updates
to all parity chunks. We ensure that the failed chunk is
reconstructed before its corresponding parity chunks are
updated, thereby eliminating the need of resolving any
inconsistency. After the failed chunk is reconstructed,
the data server (which may be the redirected server if the
original data server fails) handles the request as in §4.3.
Note that if the failed server is a parity server, the data
server sends the data delta to the redirected server.
5.5 After Failures
When a failed server is back to normal, it is in the coor-
dinated normal state. All redirected servers migrate any
reconstructed objects back to the restored server, while
new proxy requests are still managed by the coordina-
tor. Specifically, if a proxy accesses an object that has
been redirected before and not yet migrated, the coordi-
nator instructs the proxy to access the redirected server;
if the redirected object has been migrated, the coordi-
nator instructs the proxy to send the request to the re-
stored server. When all data migration is completed, the
restored server switches to the normal state, and prox-
ies can issue decentralized requests without involving the
coordinator.
6 Implementation
MemEC is deployable on commodity hardware and op-
erating systems. We have implemented a MemEC pro-
totype in C++ on Linux in about 34K lines of code. We
use the Spread toolkit [11] to implement atomic broad-
cast for server state synchronization (§5.2), and use In-
tel’s Storage Acceleration Library [6] to realize erasure
coding.
MemEC is optimized for high network performance.
It maintains persistent TCP connections between the co-
ordinator, proxies, and servers to save connection estab-
lishment overhead. It also uses non-blocking socket I/O
based on epoll [33], a Linux-specific I/O event notifi-
cation mechanism that polls multiple sockets with O(1)
complexity.
In addition, MemEC exploits multi-threading to par-
allelize I/O operations. Each entity (i.e., the coordina-
tor, proxy, or server) uses a dedicated thread to poll I/O
events and multiple worker threads to process the re-
ceived events. It also uses multiple worker threads to
send data to different destinations in parallel (e.g., in
SET request). To mitigate context switching in multi-
threading, MemEC adopts an event-driven architecture.
Specifically, each entity consists of a multi-producer,
multi-consumer event queue and a fixed number of
worker threads. When the polling thread receives a new
I/O event, it dispatches the event, via the event queue,
to one of multiple worker threads for processing. Each
worker thread may also insert one or multiple events to
the event queue for further processing (e.g., sealing a
data chunk after a SET request). As multiple worker
threads process the I/O events in parallel, the overall la-
tency of request handling is significantly reduced.
7 Evaluation
We conduct extensive testbed experiments on MemEC
under commodity settings. We run MemEC on a cluster
of 21 machines, including one coordinator, four proxies,
and 16 servers. Each machine runs Ubuntu 12.04 LTS
with the Linux kernel version 3.5.0-54-generic or higher.
All servers are equipped with Intel Core i5-3570 3.4GHz
CPU, while the coordinator and all proxies are equipped
with Intel Core i5-2400 3.1GHz CPU. Each server pre-
allocates 8GB memory to form a KV store of 128GB
capacity in total. All machines are interconnected via a
Gigabit full-duplex switch.
We use workloads derived from YCSB version 0.7.0
[23] to evaluate MemEC in both normal and degraded
modes. We focus on the read-heavy and update-heavy
workloads, namely A, B, C, D, and F, as shown in Ta-
ble 1, while we omit Workload E since MemEC does not
support range queries. We co-locate both YCSB clients
and MemEC proxies in the same machine. Each of the
YCSB clients connects to its co-located MemEC proxy
via the loopback interface. Before running each work-
load, we load MemEC with 10M objects using SET re-
quests (called the load phase). Each of the four clients
then issues 5M requests via YCSB (i.e., 20M requests
Workload Proportions of requests
A (Update heavy) 50% GET, 50% UPDATE
B (Read mostly) 95% GET, 5% UPDATE
C (Read only) 100% GET
D (Read latest) 95% GET, 5% SET
F (Read-modify-
write)
50% GET, 50% read-modify-
write (GET and UPDATE)
Table 1: YCSB workloads used in our experiments.
in total), while the access pattern follows a heavy-tailed
Zipf distribution with the shape parameter 0.99.
Our experiments focus on the workloads with small
objects. We divide the set of objects into two halves,
whose value sizes are set to 8 bytes and 32 bytes. Two
clients issue requests with 8-byte values, and the other
two clients issue requests with 32-byte values. In Ex-
periment 3, we also consider larger value sizes. Also,
we set the key size as 24 bytes for all objects, since the
minimum configurable key size in YCSB is 23 bytes and
we use one extra byte to distinguish between two value
sizes. For MemEC, we fix c= 16 stripe lists (§4.2) and
the chunk size as 4KB.
To fully exploit multi-threading, we tune the numbers
of threads in YCSB and MemEC for maximum possi-
ble performance. Finally, we fix 64 threads in YCSB
for workload generation and 12 worker threads in each
MemEC node (i.e., the coordinator and each of the prox-
ies and servers).
We plot the average results over 10 runs with 95%
confidence intervals based on the student’s t-distribution.
Some intervals may be invisible due to small variations.
7.1 Performance in Normal Mode
We start with evaluating MemEC in normal mode when
no failure happens.
Experiment 1 (Comparisons with existing systems):
We compare MemEC with two existing in-memory KV
stores: Redis 3.0.7 [8] and Memcached 1.4.25 [7]. Our
objective here is not to show which system is better than
others, since all systems are implemented with differ-
ent functionalities; in fact, Redis and Memcached sup-
port more features (e.g., object eviction) than MemEC.
Instead, our objective is to validate the implementation
of our MemEC prototype, such that its performance
matches that of state-of-the-arts.
We use the default settings for both Redis and Mem-
cached, except that we configure 12 worker threads in
Memcached as in MemEC.Memcached does not support
fault tolerance, while Redis uses replication for fault tol-
erance. We disable the replication in Redis to maximize
its performance. For MemEC, we disable erasure cod-
ing and set n=10, such that all stripe lists contain data
servers only.
Figure 5(a) shows the aggregate throughput over all
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Figure 5: Experiment 1: Comparisons of MemEC, Re-
dis, and Memcached.
objects for different systems. MemEC’s throughput is
2.7–3.1× of Memcached’s in all cases. The low through-
put of Memcached may be explained by its poor scal-
ability on multi-core CPUs [29]. Compared to Re-
dis, MemEC’s throughput is 4.2× of Redis’s in the
load phase. MemEC is much faster since it lever-
ages multi-threading to handle SET requests on multi-
ple servers in parallel, while Redis uses a mostly single-
threaded design to serve requests (some slow I/O re-
quests are served via multi-threading) [9]. On the other
hand, MemEC’s throughput is close to Redis’s in Work-
loads A–F: MemEC is faster in Workload A (which is
update-heavy) by 8.4%, while Redis is slightly faster
in Workloads B–F (which are read-heavy) by 1.2–3.3%.
Since reading an object only involves a single server,
there is no significant performance difference between
single- and multi-threading.
Figure 5(b) depicts the 95th percentile latencies of dif-
ferent systems. In the interest of space, we only consider
three specific types of requests: SET in the load phase,
UPDATE in Workload A, and GET in Workload C. We
find that both 8-byte and 32-byte values have very sim-
ilar latency results. Thus, we directly report the aver-
age latency over all objects (same for other experiments).
Memcached has the highest latency in all cases. MemEC
achieves 70% lower latency than that of Redis for SET,
while bothMemEC and Redis have comparable latencies
for UPDATE and GET.
We point out that MemEC has comparable perfor-
mance to existing in-memory storage systems proposed
in the literature (e.g., [19, 30, 37]). For example, in a
commodity cluster over a Gigabit network, their access
latencies are reportedly in the range of few milliseconds.
Experiment 2 (Erasure coding in MemEC): We study
the erasure coding overhead in MemEC. Here, we con-
sider RDP codes [24] and Reed-Solomon (RS) codes
[44]. RDP codes are double-fault tolerant. They perform
only bitwise XOR-based coding operations and are com-
putationally efficient. RS codes perform Galois Field
arithmetic (§2) and are generally more computationally
expensive than RDP codes, but they can tolerate a gen-
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Figure 6: Experiment 2: Performance of different era-
sure coding schemes in MemEC and 3-way replication
in Redis.
eral number of server failures. We set (n, k) = (10, 8).
We also evaluateMemECwhen no erasure coding is used
(as in Experiment 1), referred to as No coding, as well as
Redis with 3-way replication.
Figure 6(a) shows the aggregate throughput over all
objects for different coding schemes. We focus on the
load phase, Workload A, and Workload C. In the load
phase, the throughput of RDP and RS drops to 57.3%
and 57.2% of that without coding, respectively, mainly
due to the extra traffic generated to parity servers in
SET requests. Also, in Workload A, the throughput
values of RDP and RS codes are 90.0% and 88.2% of
that without coding, respectively. Thus, erasure cod-
ing does not significantly reduce the performance for
UPDATE requests. Furthermore, in Workload C, both
coding schemes achieve similar throughput to that with-
out coding, as GET requests only access data servers.
Overall, both RDP and RS codes have very similar re-
sults, so the coding schemes do not significantly change
the performance.
Compared to 3-way replication in Redis, we observe
that the throughput of MemEC with RDP and RS is at
least 164%, 4.0%, and 3.9% higher in the load phase,
Workload A, and Workload C, respectively. Our results
are consistent with those in Experiment 1.
Figure 6(b) shows the 95th percentile latencies. For
SET requests, both RDP and RS codes have 55.8%
higher latencies than without coding; for UPDATE re-
quests, they are 21.7% higher than without coding; for
GET, the latencies are almost identical across coding
schemes.
Experiment 3 (Workloads of larger value sizes): We
study how MemEC performs for larger value sizes, even
though it is designed for small objects. Specifically,
in each test, we configure each of the four clients to
send objects of the same value size, which we vary from
8 bytes to 16KB across different tests. Each client first
loads 250K objects (i.e., 1M objects in total). Each of the
four clients then issues 500K requests (i.e., 2M requests
in total) in both Workload A andWorkload C. Recall that
if an object has size larger than the 4KB chunk size, it
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Figure 8: Experiment 4: Impact of transient failures.
will be split into fragments before being stored (§3.2).
We use RDP with (n, k)=(10, 8) for erasure coding.
Figure 7 shows the aggregate throughput versus dif-
ferent value sizes. When the value size is below 1KB,
the performance is bottlenecked by the processing over-
head of small objects. As the value size is at least
1KB, the throughput, in terms of the amount of data
being processed per second, is saturated at 36.5MB/s,
181MB/s, and 89.0MB/s for the load phase, Workload A,
and Workload C, respectively. Note that the network
bandwidth is not fully utilized for large objects. For ex-
ample, for the load phase, we expect that four proxies
can theoretically achieve an effective network speed of
at most 4×1253 =167MB/s (recall that a proxy first writes
data via SET with (n − k + 1)-way replication (§4.3)).
We plan to optimize the implementation for large objects
as future work.
7.2 Performance in Degraded Mode
We now evaluate MemEC in degraded mode and exam-
ine the impact of transient failures. We use RDP [24]
with (n, k) = (10, 8) for erasure coding. We simulate a
transient failure as network congestion, by injecting an
artificial link delay to the network interface of a failed
server for each outgoing packet via the Linux traffic con-
trolling tool tc [1]. We configure the delay to follow a
normal distribution with mean 2ms and standard devia-
tion 1ms. Note that the actual delay for determining a
transient server failure varies depending on the deploy-
ment environment, and we do not explore this issue in
this work.
Experiment 4 (Impact of transient failures): We eval-
uate the degraded requests of MemEC in the presence
of transient failures. We only consider a single-server
failure, while the results are similar for a double-server
failure. We consider two independent cases:
• Before writes: A transient failure happens before
MemEC stores any data. We then run the load phase
followed by Workload A. Each proxy issues degraded
SET requests that redirect writes from the failed server
to a redirected server in the load phase. Subse-
quent GET and UPDATE requests are also redirected
in Workload A.
• After writes: We run the load phase and trigger a tran-
sient failure after the load phase is completed. We then
run Workloads A and C to evaluate degraded GET and
degraded UPDATE.
We compare the performance of MemEC for three set-
tings: (1) there is no failure (labeled asNormal); (2) there
is a failure and MemEC enables degraded request han-
dling (labeled as Degraded); and (3) there is a failure but
degraded request handling is disabled (i.e., a request con-
tacts a failed server that is under network congestion and
waits for its delayed response).
Figure 8(a) shows the 95th percentile latencies of SET,
UPDATE, and GET requests when transient failures occur
before writes. Compared to normal mode, the latency of
SET in the load phase increases by 11.6% with degraded
request handing enabled. For Workload A, the latencies
of UPDATE and GET increase by 50.9% and 36.9%, re-
spectively. However, with degraded request handling dis-
abled, the latencies are much higher; for example, they
increase by 469% and 326% in UPDATE and GET over
normal mode, respectively.
Figure 8(b) shows the 95th percentile latencies of GET
requests in Workloads A and C, and UPDATE requests in
Workload A when transient failures occur after writes.
The latencies of GET and UPDATE increase by at most
180% and 178%, respectively. Note that the latencies of
degradedGET inWorkloads A and C differ, which can be
explained by the need of maintaining consistency within
the same stripe. Specifically, if a redirected server re-
ceives an UPDATE before GET, it reconstructs all failed
chunks of the same stripe before modifying the data and
parity chunks so as to avoid inconsistency caused by
concurrent access to parity chunks by UPDATE and re-
construction of chunks by GET. The following GET re-
quests to the failed data chunks are blocked until the re-
constructed chunks are available on the redirected server.
Thus a higher latency is observed in Workload A, but not
in Workload C, which involves no UPDATE.
Note that the impact of reconstructing failed data on
a read-heavy workload is very small. For example, the
latency of GET in Workload C only increases by 6.0%
State transition
Elapsed time (ms)
Single failure Double failure
TN→D
With req. 4.77 ± 0.79 9.24 ± 0.78
No req. 1.74 ± 0.09 4.91 ± 0.89
TD→N
With req. 628.5 ± 43.9 667.5 ± 27.2
No req. 0.91 ± 0.46 1.10 ± 0.19
Table 2: Experiment 5: Average elapsed times of state
transitions with 95% confidence intervals.
when compared to normal mode. MemEC performs re-
construction at the granularity of chunks, and the re-
construction overhead can be amortized over subsequent
GET requests to the same reconstructed chunks (§5.4).
Experiment 5 (State transition overhead): We further
study the state transition overhead in the presence of a
transient failure. We consider the transitions when a
failed server switches from the normal to degraded states
(denoted as TN→D) and later when it switches from the
degraded to normal states (denoted as TD→N ). In addi-
tion to a single-server failure, we also consider the case
of a double-server failure, in which two servers fail si-
multaneously.
We compare the cases with and without ongoing re-
quests during the transitions. For the former, we run
Workload A to generate ongoing requests until the la-
tency becomes stable, and trigger a transient failure. We
then restore the failure 5s later. We measure both the
elapsed times for the state transitions and the average la-
tencies of UPDATE and GET requests over the workload.
Table 2 first shows the elapsed times of state transi-
tions, averaged over 10 runs with 95% confidence inter-
vals. For a single-server failure, TN→D takes 4.77ms
and 1.74ms on average with and without requests, re-
spectively. The difference between the two elapsed times
is mainly caused by reverting parity updates of incom-
plete requests. The average elapsed times for TD→N
are 628.5ms and 0.91ms with and without requests, re-
spectively. The elapsed time for TD→N with ongoing re-
quests includes data migration from the redirected server
to the restored server, so it is significantly larger than that
without any request. For a double-server failure, the tran-
sitions TN→D and TD→N with ongoing requests spend
9.24ms and 667.5ms, respectively. Note that the elapsed
times for TN→D are higher than that for TD→N even
though when there is no request. The reason is that the
atomic broadcast for the transition TN→D involves each
failed server, which experiences network congestion. In
all cases, a state transition incurs less than 1s, so we ex-
pect that its overhead is limited.
8 Related Work
Erasure coding has been studied in large-scale KV stores
for low-redundancy fault tolerance, such as distributed
hash tables (DHTs) [20, 25, 45] and cloud storage [5, 13,
36]. However, the above systems store large-size objects
and perform erasure coding on a per-object basis, which
is inadequate for in-memory KV stores in which small
objects dominate as we show in this paper.
Some in-memory KV stores combine erasure coding
and replication, such as LH*RS [21, 22, 38] and Cocy-
tus [50]. They store keys and metadata by replication,
while storing values of multiple objects by erasure cod-
ing. MemEC differs from LH*RS and Cocytus by apply-
ing erasure coding across objects in entirety to further re-
duce redundancy based on the all-encoding data model.
We also design MemEC to explicitly support efficient
workflows of degraded requests and transitions between
normal and degraded modes.
Ensuring parity consistency is critical in any erasure-
coded storage system. Myriad [17] leverages two-
phase commit to consistently update both data and parity
chunks. LH*RS [38] uses a variant of two-phase com-
mit to retain data delta backups in a temporary buffer
for possible rollbacks. Aguilera et al. [12] propose to
keep a recent list of the previous data update requests
to resolve consistency of multiple chunks. Pahoehoe
[13] associates each version of object with a globally
unique timestamp to guarantee eventual consistency. Co-
cytus [50] piggybacks the commit message of each pre-
vious request in the current parity update and avoids the
two rounds of message exchanges in two-phase commit.
MemEC keeps data delta backups as in LH*RS [38] for
reverting any inconsistent change when a server fails.
9 Conclusion
This paper presents MemEC, which makes a case of how
to efficiently apply erasure coding to small objects in in-
memory KV storage. We propose an all-encoding data
model that effectively reduces redundancy for fault toler-
ance by up to 60% over existing approaches. We design
and implement MemEC to efficiently operate in both
normal and degraded modes. We evaluate our MemEC
prototype running on commodity hardware, and demon-
strate its efficiency in both normal and degraded modes
under YCSB benchmarks.
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